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Abstract
The adversarial wiretap channel (AWTC) model is a secure communication model that eavesdropper
can directly read and write fractions of the transmitted bits in legitimate communication. In this paper
we propose a secure polar coding scheme to provide secure and reliable communication over the AWTC
model. For the adversarial reading and writing action, we present a ρ equivalent channel block and apply
the non-stationary polarization on it. By comparing the polarization result of ρ equivalent channel block
with a ρ BEC block (channel block of BEC with erase probability ρ), we find that the polarized subsets
of ρ BEC block is fully contained by the polarized subsets of ρ equivalent channel block by choosing
the polarization parameter β properly. Based on this observation, we construct a secure polar coding
scheme on the ρ BEC blocks for the AWTC model. We theoretically prove that the proposed scheme
achieves the secrecy capacity of AWTC model under both reliability and strong security criterions with
an infinite block length N . Further, by simulations, we prove that the proposed scheme can provide
secure and reliable communication over AWTC model with a finite block length N .
Index Terms
adversarial wiretap channels, polar codes, non-stationary polarization, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wiretap channel (WTC) model, introduced by Wyner in 1975 [1], is a primitive secure
communication model in which two legitimate users Alice and Bob communicates through a
noise main channel while an eavesdropper Eve wiretaps through a noise wiretap channel. Later in
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2[2], wiretap channel type II (WTC-II) model is introduced in which the main channel is noiseless
and the eavesdropper Eve can arbitrarily choose and directly read a fixed fraction of transmitted
bits. Further in [3], WTC-II model is extended to adversarial wiretap channel (AWTC) model
in which the eavesdropper Eve can directly read and write the transmitted bits with a pair of fix
fractions.
According to Wyner’s secure coding theory, channel noise of the WTC model can be used
to provide perfect secrecy, and the goal for secure codes construction is achieving the secrecy
capacity [1]. Polar codes [4], known as the first capacity achieving codes with low complexity,
has presented excellent performance in providing the perfect secrecy over WTC models. Explicit
secure polar codes have already achieved the secrecy capacities of Wyner’s WTC model [5], [6]
and several extended WTC models [7]–[11]. These success of polar codes on WTC models make
polar codes a considerable good option for achieving the secrecy capacity of AWTC model.
However, comparing with the WTC models, the secure codes construction of AWTC model
is much more complicated. Because in AWTC model, both adversarial reading and writing
directly act on the transmitted bits, and the corresponding bit index sets are arbitrarily chosen
and unknown to legitimate parties. It is hard to construct the secure polar codes without precise
information of eavesdropper’s actions or constant channel blocks.
A. Our Contributions
In this work, we consider the secrecy capacity achieving problem of AWTC model and
intent to construct a corresponding secure polar coding scheme to provide secure and reliable
communication. Our contributions are summarized as follow:
• For the adversarial reading and writing operations of AWTC model, we present an equivalent
model as the ρ equivalent channel block (Def. 5) which is an N length non-stationary
channel block composed of full-noise BECs with fraction ρ and noiseless BECs with fraction
1−ρ. Then we apply the non-stationary channel polarization [14] on the ρ equivalent channel
block and find that it can be fully polarized by the channel polarization operation GN into
perfect full-noise channels with index set Hρ and perfect noiseless channels with index set
Lρ, even if N is finite.
• Next, we take a ρ BEC block (Def. 8) which is an N length stationary BEC block with
erase probability ρ, and polarize it by the channel polarization operation GN into almost
full-noise channels with index set Hρ and almost noiseless channels with index set Lρ .
3Then we analyze the relationship of ρ equivalent channel block and ρ BEC block on the
channel polarization by calculating the excluding rate Re (Def. 9) which is the sum rate of
Hρ not included in Hρ and Lρ not included in Lρ. We carry out a simulation to test Re
on different values of triple (N, β, ρ). From the simulation results (Fig. 3), we observe that
by choosing a proper β = β∗ with given (N, ρ), have Re = 0, Hρ ⊆ Hρ and Lρ ⊆ Lρ
(Prop. 1).
• Next, for the AWTC model, we have the actual index partition (I,R,F ,B) according to
the polarization of ρ equivalent channel block which is unknown to legitimate parties, and
the index partition (I,R,F,B) according to the polarization of ρ BEC block which
is constructed by legitimate parties. By comparing these two partitions (Fig. 4), we find
that using (I,R,F,B) as the substitution of (I,R,F ,B) with a proper β∗ will not
compromise security or reliability. Thus we construct the secure polar coding scheme
for AWTC model by apply the multi-block canning structure [6] on the index subsets
(I,R,F,B).
• At last, we theoretically analyze the performance of the proposed secure polar coding scheme
and prove that the secrecy capacity of AWTC model can be achieved when N goes infinity.
We also run simulations to test the performance of the scheme in finite N cases. The
simulation results match our theoretically analysis and prove that the proposed scheme
successfully provide a reliable and secure communication over AWTC model with finite
block length N .
B. Related Works
The first secrecy capacity achieving secure polar codes for WTC model was proposed in
[5] which sets up a basic way of secure polar codes construction that use the differences of
polarizations between main channel block and wiretap channel block to divide the channel
index into subsets with unique reliability and security properties. Further in [6], a multi-block
chaining structure was constructed as a refinement of secure polar coding scheme in [5], which is
known as one of the standard method for strong security polar coding construction and widely
applied in the follow-up works such as [7], [10]. One remarkable advantage of this standard
strong security polar coding method is the low computational complexity for both encoding and
decoding process as O(N logN).
4When the AWTC model was proposed in [3], an effective explicit secrecy capacity achieving
codes named as the capacity achieving AWTC code family was also proposed which contains
three building blocks: algebraic manipulation detection code (AMD code), subspace evasive
sets, and folded reed-solomon code (FRS code). For capacity achieving AWTC code family
in [3], the encoding complexity is O((N log q)2) where q is a prime satisfying q > Nu for
a u-folded RS codes, the combined computational complexity of the FRS decoding algorithm
and subspace evasive sets intersection algorithm is poly(1/ξ)D/ξ log log 1/ξ, the AMD verification
costs O((N log q)2), thus the total complexity of the decoding is poly(N). Then for our pro-
posed secure polar coding scheme, since we only apply the standard method of strong security
polar coding construction on the ρ BEC blocks, both encoding and decoding computational
complexities are O(N logN), which is lower than the secure codes in [3].
C. Paper Organizations
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section II presents the AWTC model. Section III
presents our construction of secure polar coding scheme for AWTC model. Section IV presents
the theoretical analysis of performance and the simulations. Finally section V concludes the
paper.
II. THE ADVERSARIAL WIRETAP CHANNEL MODEL
Notations: We define the integer interval [[a, b]] as the integer set between bac and dbe. For
n ∈ N, define N , 2n. Denote X , Y , Z,... random variables (RVs) taking values in alphabets
X , Y , Z ,... and the sample values of these RVs are denoted by x, y, z,... respectively. Then
pXY denotes the joint probability of X and Y , and pX , pY denotes the marginal probabilities.
Especially for channel W , the transition probability is defined as WY |X and W for simplicity.
Also we denote a N size vector X1:N , (X1, X2, ..., XN). When the context makes clear that
we are dealing with vectors, we write XN in place of X1:N . And for any index set A j [[1, N ]],
we define XA , {X i}i∈A. For the polar codes, we denote GN the generator matrix , R the bit
reverse matrix, F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
and ⊗ the Kronecker product, and we have GN = RF⊗n. Denote
A[·] as the average.
Now we present the definition of adversarial wiretap channel model (AWTC) [3].
Definition 1 The adversarial wiretap channel model is defined as (X ,Y ,Z, ρr, ρw,Sr,Sw). In
the model, legitimate parties are communicating through a noiseless channel with channel input
5alphabet X . For N -length transmitted codewords X1:N ∈ XN , there are two types of adversarial
actions: reading and writing.
• Reading: Eavesdropper can arbitrarily select an index subset Sr ⊆ [[1, N ]] with fixed fraction
ρr =
|Sr|
N
and directly reads the corresponding transmitted codewords XSr . For the obtained
bits at eavesdropper, ZN with alphabet Z , has
Zi =
X
i if i ∈ Sr
? if i ∈ Scr
(1)
where “?” is the dump letter.
• Writing: Eavesdropper can arbitrarily select an index subset Sw ⊆ [[1, N ]] with fixed fraction
ρw =
|Sw|
N
and directly writes the corresponding transmitted codewords XSw . For the channel
output at legitimate receiver, Y N with alphabet Y , has
Y i =
? if i ∈ SwX i if i ∈ Scw (2)
where “?” is the dump letter.
Encoder Noiseless Channel Decoder
 Reading
 Writing
½r Zi =
(
X i i 2 Sr
? i =2 Sr
½w Y i =
(
? i 2 Sw
Xi i =2 Sw
Alice Bob
Eve
M XN Y N M^
ZN
Fig. 1. The adversarial wiretap channel model.
The communication process over AWTC is illustrated in Fig. 1. Legitimate user Alice want to
send confidential message M to legitimate user Bob with the existence of an active eavesdropper
Eve. Alice encodes the message M into channel input XN and transmits XN to Bob through a
noiseless main channel. Eve arbitrarily reads XSr with fixed rate ρr and obtains the corresponding
ZN . Eve also arbitrarily writes XSw with fixed rate ρw. Then Bob receives the modified channel
output as Y N and decodes it into estimated confidential message Mˆ .
6Definition 2 For any (2NR, N) secure codes of AWTC, the performances can be measured as
follow.
• Reliability is measured by error probability Pe = Pr(M 6= Mˆ). The reliability criterion is
limN→∞ Pe = 0.
• Security is measured by information leakage L = I(ZN ;M). The weak security criterion
is limN→∞ LN = 0; the strong security criterion is limN→∞ L = 0.
The secrecy capacity of AWTC under reliability and security criterions has been characterized
in [3], which is presented as follow.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy capacity [3]) The perfect secrecy capacity of the AWTC with (ρr, ρw) is
Cs = 1− ρr − ρw. (3)
In this paper, we intend to present a polar codes based solution for the problem of secure and
reliable communication over AWTC model, and try to achieve the secrecy capacity of Theo. 1.
III. SECURE POLAR CODES
In this section, we present a secure coding scheme for the AWTC model by polar codes.
A. BEC Based Equivalent AWTC Model
Unlike ordinary WTC model [1], adversarial actions in AWTC are not carried out through a
wiretap channel but directly work on the transmitted bits in the communication channel. Since
secure polar codes are built on polarized channels, without a wiretap channel, secure polar
codes cannot be directly constructed on AWTC. Thus we first need to present the channel based
expression for the reading and writing actions of AWTC.
Definition 3 Denote W1 : {0, 1} → {0, 1, ?} the full-noise binary erase channel (BEC) with
erase probability  = 1 and I(W1) = 0. Denote W0 : {0, 1} → {0, 1, ?} the noiseless BEC
with erase probability  = 0 and I(W0) = 0.
Without loss of generality, we consider the binary input case of AWTC model in Def. 1 that
X = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1, ?} and Z = {0, 1, ?}. Comparing the reading and writing actions with
the W1 and W0 , we can observe that
7• For the reading action, the read bits equals to being transmitted through W0 to Eve, the
unread bits equals to being transmitted through W1 to Eve.
• For the writing action, the written bits equals to being transmitted through W1 to Bob, the
unwritten bits equals to being transmitted through W0 to Bob.
Thus we have the following BEC based equivalent model for AWTC model.
Definition 4 The BEC based equivalent AWTC model is defined as (WNw ,WNr ) : XN → YN ,ZN
that
• WNw : XN → YN is the writing-equivalent N -length main channel block. For arbitrarily
chosen Sw ⊆ [[1, N ]] with fixed fraction ρw, have
W iw =
W1 : W
i
w(y =?|x) = 1 if i ∈ Sw
W0 : W
i
w(y = x|x) = 1 if i ∈ Scw.
(4)
• WNr : XN → ZN is the reading-equivalent N -length wiretap channel block. For arbitrarily
chosen Sr ⊆ [[1, N ]] with fixed fraction ρr, have
W ir =
W0 : W
i
r(z = x|x) = 1 if i ∈ Sr
W1 : W
i
r(z =?|x) = 1 if i ∈ Scr .
(5)
Comparing the WNw and W
N
r in Def. 4, we can observe that both the equivalent channel blocks
have a same formation as follow.
Definition 5 The ρ equivalent channel block is defined as WNρ : XN → YN that for arbitrarily
chosen Sρ ⊆ [[1, N ]] with fixed fraction ρ,
W iρ =
W1 : W
i
ρ(y =?|x) = 1 if i ∈ Sρ
W0 : W
i
ρ(y = x|x) = 1 if i ∈ Scρ.
(6)
The average erase probability of the channel block is ρ.
Remark 1 By setting ρ = ρw, WNρ = WNρw which becomes the writing-equivalent channel block;
by setting ρ = 1− ρr, WNρ = WN1−ρr which becomes the reading-equivalent channel block.
Therefore, by analyzing the channel polarization results of the channel operation GN on ρ
channel block, we can find a way to construct the secure polar codes.
8B. Discussion of Polarization
Now we discuss the polarization of the ρ equivalent channel block. As defined, the ρ equivalent
channel block is an N -length non-stationary channel sequence consisted of full noise BEC W1
with fraction ρ and noiseless BEC W0 with fraction 1 − ρ. The polarization theory of non-
stationary channel sequence has been studied in [12]–[14] that the channel operation GN has a
similar polarization effect on the non-stationary channel sequence.
Theorem 2 (Non-stationary polarization [14, Theo. 2]) For any B-DMC W 1:N with different
transition probabilities, the generated channels W (i)N form non-stationary channel transformation
GN are polarized in the sense that, for any fixed δ ∈ (0, 1), as N →∞, the fraction of indices
i ∈ [[1, N ]] for which I(W (i)N ) ∈ (1 − δ, 1] goes to A[I(W 1:N)] and the fraction for which
I(W
(i)
N ) ∈ [0, δ) goes to 1− A[I(W 1:N)]. Also can be write as
I∞ =
1 w.p. A[I(W
1:N)]
0 w.p. 1− A[I(W 1:N)],
(7)
where A[I(W 1:N)] is the average of the initial I(W (i)) for all the i ∈ [[1, N ]].
For non-stationary polarization theory, the 2×2 kernel transformation of the channel operation
GN is defined as follow.
1u
2u
1x
2x
1y
2y
1W
2W
Fig. 2. The non-stationary 2× 2 kernel transformation.
Definition 6 ( [14])Define (W 1,W 2) 7→ (W−,W+) the non-stationary 2 × 2 kernel transfor-
mation, illustrated in Fig. 2, which contains a pair of channel operation (,) that
W− = W 1 W 2 and W+ = W 1 W 2, (8)
respectively as
W−(f(y1, y2)|u1) =
∑
u2∈U
1
2
W 1(y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W 2(y2|u2),
W+(f(y1, y2), u1|u2) = 1
2
W 1(y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W 2(y2|u2).
(10)
9Definition 7 ( [4]) For any given B-DMC W : X → Y , the Bhattacharyya parameter is defined
as
Z(W ) ,
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1). (11)
For BEC, have I(W ) = 1− Z(W ).
Lemma 1 ( [14, Lem. 2])For non-stationary 2×2 kernel transformation (W 1,W 2) 7→ (W−,W+),
have
Z(W+) = Z(W 1)Z(W 2),
Z(W−) ≤ Z(W 1) + Z(W 2)− Z(W 1)Z(W 2).
(13)
The second equal holds when W 1 and W 2 are BECs.
Now we consider the non-stationary channel transformation of the ρ equivalent channel block
WNρ .
Let N = 2n and W (1:N)ρN be the channel sequence generated from W
N
ρ by the non-stationary
channel operation GN with n levels of recursively 2 × 2 kernel transformation (W 1,W 2) 7→
(W−,W+). Since WNρ is formed by W1 and W0 that Z(W1) = 1 and Z(W0) = 0, for
i ∈ [[1, N ]], ρ fraction of Z(W iρ) is 1 and 1− ρ fraction of Z(W iρ) is 0.
Then by Lem. 1, for each recursion level of 2×2 kernel channel transformation, there are only
three possible cases for the Bhattacharyya parameter values [Z(W 1), Z(W 2)] 7→ [Z(W−), Z(W+)]
that (1, 1) 7→ (1, 1), (1, 0) 7→ (1, 0) and (0, 0) 7→ (0, 0). Hence we can observe that after N levels
of kernel transformation, the fraction of Z(W (i)ρN) = 1 remains ρ and Z(W
(i)
ρN) = 0 remains 1−ρ.
Thus for non-stationary channel polarization of WNρ , we have the following polarized index sets
of [[1, N ]]:
Hρ = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρN) = 1},
Lρ = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρN) = 0},
(15)
where Hρ is the polarized full-noise index set, and Lρ is the polarized noiseless index set.
Remark 2 The ρ equivalent channel block WNρ can be fully polarized by non-stationary polar-
ization operation GN that Hcρ = Lρ and Hρ = Lcρ, even if N is finite.
Note that from the perspective of legitimate parties, because the index set Sρ it is arbitrarily
chosen with fixed fraction ρ by eavesdropper and different Sρ can result in different Hρ and Lρ,
they cannot know the precise Hρ and Lρ for constructing the secure polar codes.
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Definition 8 Define a ρ BEC block as WNρ which is an N -length stationary sequence of channel
Wρ , where Wρ : {0, 1} → {0, 1, ?} is the BEC with erase probability  = ρ.
Remark 3 Comparing the ρ BEC block WNρ in Def. 8 with the ρ equivalent channel block
WNρ in Def. 5, both channel models have a same average erase probability as ρ. From the
perspective of transmission effect, WNρ is the expectation of W
N
ρ . Thus by the Bernoulli’s law
of large Numbers, when N goes infinity, the WNρ can be equivalent to the W
N
ρ . However when
N is finite, these two channel models are not equivalent.
Next we analyze their relationship on the channel polarization. According to the channel
polarization theory, by the channel operation GN , the ρ BEC block WNρ can be polarized as
follow. Let W (1:N)ρN be the channel sequence generated from W
N
ρ by the channel polarization
operation. Then for any 0 < β < 1
2
, δN = 2−N
β , the polarized index sets of [[1, N ]] are
Hρ = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρN) ≥ 1− δN},
Lρ = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρN) ≤ δN},
(17)
where Hρ is the polarized full-noise index set, and Lρ is the polarized noiseless index set.
Remark 4 For polar codes, only in case of infinite N , the channel block can be fully polarized
by any 0 < β < 1
2
, which satisfies Hcρ = Lρ and Hρ = Lcρ . However, in case of finite N ,
the polarization cannot be perfect but directly influenced by the value of β. If β decreases, both
transmission rate and upper bound of decoding bit error rate will increase. If β increases, both
code rate |Lρ|/N and upper bound of decoding bit error rate will decrease.
To analyze the polarization relationship between WNρ and W
N
ρ , we use the excluding rate
Re in Def. 9 to measure the sum rate of Hρ excluded from Hρ and Lρ excluded from Lρ. If
Re = 0, it means Hρ ⊆ Hρ and Lρ ⊆ Lρ.
Definition 9 The excluding rate Re is defined as
Re =
1
N
(|Hρ \ Hρ|+ |Lρ \ Lρ|), (18)
where (Hρ ,Lρ) are the polarized subsets of ρ BEC block WNρ , (Hρ,Lρ) are the polarized
subsets of ρ equivalent channel block WNρ .
There are four factors can influence Re, which are block length N , polarization parameter
0 < β < 1
2
, fraction 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and index set Sρ. Thus we choose N from 26 to 215, β from
11
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(i) Re with ρ = 0.9
Fig. 3. The excluding rate Re with different values of N , β and ρ.
0.01 to 0.49 at 0.03 intervals and ρ from 0.1 to 0.9 at 0.1 intervals. Then, in order to cover the
randomness of index set Sρ, for each value of triple (N, β, ρ), we calculate the corresponding
excluding rates for 100 arbitrarily chosen Sρ and take an average rate. The calculation results
of excluding rate is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Proposition 1 From Fig. 3, it can be observed that for the given ρ and N with arbitrarily chosen
Sρ, there exists β = β∗ which makes Re = 0, Hρ ⊆ Hρ and Lρ ⊆ Lρ. With the increasing of
block length N , the lower bound of β∗ is decreasing.
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C. Secure Polar Coding Scheme
Based on Prop. 1, now we can construct the secure polar code for AWTC model.
Remind that in AWTC model, for the adversarial writing and reading operations, the fraction
pair (ρw, ρr) of is publicly known and fixed, but the index pair (Sw,Sr) is arbitrarily chosen by
eavesdropper and unknown to legitimate parties.
Also remind that for adversarial writing operation with fraction ρw, the equivalent channel
block WNw = W
N
ρw and the corresponding ρ BEC block is W
N
ρw
. For adversarial reading operation
with fraction ρr, the equivalent channel block WNr = W
N
1−ρr and the corresponding ρ BEC block
is WN1−ρr .
For arbitrarily chosen (Sw,Sr), the actual non-stationary polarization of equivalent channel
block WNw and W
N
r are as follow.
Hw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) = 1},
Lw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)wN) = 0},
Hr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) = 1},
Lr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)rN) = 0},
(20)
where W (i)wN and W
(i)
rN are the generated channel by non-stationary channel operation GN re-
spectively from WNw and W
N
r . With these actual polarization results, the index [[1, N ]] can be
divided into following four subsets:
I = Lw ∩Hr,
R = Lw ∩Hcr,
F = Lcw ∩Hr,
B = Lcw ∩Hcr,
(22)
where I is secure and reliable, R is insecure but reliable, F is secure but unreliable, and B is
insecure and unreliable. Note that the index sets (Sw,Sr) is arbitrarily chosen by eavesdropper,
thus legitimate parties cannot know the actual polarization results (Hw,Lw,Hr,Lr) or the actual
division (I,R,F ,B).
For legitimate parties, because they know the fraction pair (ρw, ρr), what they can do is to
build the corresponding ρ BEC blocks, as WNρw for writing operation and W
N
1−ρr for reading
13
operation. Then according to Prop. 1, for the given (N, ρw, ρr), they can choose a proper β∗,
δN = 2
−Nβ∗ to polarize the block pair (WNρw ,W
N
1−ρr ) as
Hρw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρwN) ≥ 1− δN},
Lρw = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)ρwN) ≤ δN},
H1−ρr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)1−ρrN) ≥ 1− δN},
L1−ρr = {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z(W (i)1−ρrN) ≤ δN},
(24)
which satisfies Hρw ⊆ Hw, Lρw ⊆ Lw, H1−ρr ⊆ Hr and L1−ρr ⊆ Lr. Further, they can divide
the index [[1, N ]] as
I = Lρw ∩H1−ρr ,
R = Lρw ∩Hc1−ρr ,
F = Lcρw ∩H1−ρr ,
B = Lcρw ∩Hc1−ρr .
(26)
Now we analyze the actual properties of above divided subsets. Fig. 4 illustrates the comparison
of the two subsets divisions (I,R,F ,B) and (I,R,F,B).
I
F B
R
I² R²
F² B²
Lw
Lcw
HcrHr
L²½w
Lc²½w
Hc²1¡½rH²1¡½r
Fig. 4. Comparison of the two subsets divisions (22) and (26).
• Subset I: by choosing a proper β∗, have Lρw ⊆ Lw and H1−ρr ⊆ Hr, thus I ⊆ I, which
indicates that actual polarized channels in I are secure and reliable.
• Subset R: by choosing a proper β∗, have R ⊆ Lρw ⊆ Lw, thus there is no intersection
of R and (F ,B), which indicates that actual polarized channels in R are reliable. As
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shown in Fig. 4, the part of R included in R is reliable but insecure, the rest part of R
is included in I which is secure and reliable.
• Subset F: by choosing a proper β∗, have F ⊆ H1−ρr ⊆ Hr, thus there is no intersection of
F and (R,B), which indicates that actual polarized channels in F are secure. As shown in
Fig. 4, the parts of F included in F is secure but unreliable, the rest part of F is included
in I which is secure and reliable.
• Subset B: by choosing a proper β∗, have Lcw ⊆ Lcρw and Hcr ⊆ Hc1−ρr , thus B ⊆ B that B
has covered all the insecure and unreliable actual polarized channels. As shown in Fig. 4,
except for the entire subset B, parts of I,R and F are also included in subset B.
Since the divided subsets of ρ BEC blocks (I,R,F,B) are fixed and known, based on the
actual properties of these divided subsets, we can apply the multi-block chaining structure [6]
as follow to construct a strong security polar coding scheme.
• To build the chaining structure, separate a subset E form I that satisfies |E| = |B|.
• For subset I \ E, since the corresponding actual polarized channels is secure and reliable,
they can be used to transmit information bits.
• For subset R, since the corresponding actual polarized channels is reliable but not certainly
secure, it is used to transmit uniformly distributed random bits, so that the security can be
guaranteed.
• For subset F, since the corresponding actual polarized channels is secure but not certainly
reliable, it is used to transmit publicly known frozen bits, so that the reliability can be
guaranteed
• For subset E, since the corresponding actual polarized channels is secure and reliable, it is
used to convey uniformly distributed random bits for the subset B of next block.
• For subset B, since it includes all the insecure and unreliable actual polarized channels
of subset B, we use the chaining structure for it. In the first block, B is used to transmit
random bits pre-shared by legitimate parties; in the rest blocks, B is used to transmit bit
conveyed in E of previous block. Therefore both reliability and security can be guaranteed.
Finally, we propose the secure polar coding scheme for AWTC model.
• Preparing: consider the multi-block case with block number T , block length N = 2n and
fixed fraction pair (ρw, ρr);
– build the ρ BEC blocks WNρw for writing and W
N
1−ρr for operation;
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– choose a proper β∗ and polarize the block pair (WNρw ,W
N
1−ρr ) into (W
(1:N)
ρwN
,W
(1:N)
1−ρrN
)
to obtain Hρw , Lρw , H1−ρr and L1−ρr by (24);
– divide the index into (I,R,F,B) by (26) and separate E ⊂ I that |E| = |B|.
• Encoding:
– uI\E are assigned with information bits;
– uE∪R are assigned with uniformly distributed random bits;
– uF are assigned with publicly known frozen bits;
– if t = 1, uB are assigned with pre-shared random bits;
– if t ≥ 2, uB are assigned with the bits of uE of block t− 1;
– encode the uN into channel inputs xN by xN = uNGN .
• Transmission:
– Alice transmits xN to Bob through a noiseless communication channel;
– Eve arbitrarily chooses Sw with fraction ρw and writes xSw into “?”;
– Bob receives the modified channel outputs as yN ;
– Eve arbitrarily chooses Sr with fraction ρr and reads xSr to obtain zN .
• Decoding: Bob uses the successive cancelation (SC) decoding [4] to decode yN into uˆN as
follow:
– if i ∈ I ∪R,
uˆi = arg max
u∈{0,1}
W
(i)
ρwN
(u|uˆ1:i−1, y1:N); (27)
– if i ∈ F, uˆi is decoded as publicly known frozen bit;
– if i ∈ B, in case of t = 1, uˆi is decoded as pre-shared random bit, in case of t ≥ 2,
uˆi is decoded as corresponding bit of uˆE of block t− 1.
IV. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we discuss the performance of the proposed secure polar coding scheme for
AWTC model.
A. Theoretical Analysis
Consider the following Theorem for polar codes.
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Theorem 3 (Decoding error rate of polar codes) [5, Prop. 3] For any B-DMC channel block
WN , let A be an arbitrary subset of index [[1, N ]] and used as the information set for polar
codes. Then the corresponding block error rate of SC decoding satisfies
Pe ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W
(i)
N ). (28)
Now we analyze the performance of proposed secure polar coding scheme by reliability,
security and achievable secrecy rate.
Proposition 2 (Reliability) By choosing a proper β∗, reliability can be achieved by the proposed
secure polar coding scheme over AWTC model.
Proof: Since the frozen bits in F are publicly known and Bob known the pre-shared bits
for the first B, then according to the multi-block chaining structure, the decoding error rate
of entire T blocks are determined by the SC decoding of T blocks’ I ∪R and T − 1 blocks’
E. For each codeword X i, it is transmitted through actual equivalent channel W iw but decoded
according to BEC channel W iρw by legitimate parties, thus we use max[Z(W
(i)
wN), Z(W
(i)
ρwN
)] to
analyze the reliability of polar decoding.
Then for the decoding error of T blocks, have
Pe(T ) ≤ T
∑
i∈I∪R
max
[
Z(W
(i)
wN), Z(W
(i)
ρwN
)
]
+ (T − 1)
∑
i∈E
max
[
Z(W
(i)
wN), Z(W
(i)
ρwN
)
]
(a)
= T
∑
i∈I∪R
Z(W
(i)
ρwN
) + (T − 1)
∑
i∈E
Z(W
(i)
ρwN
)
(b)
≤ (2T − 1)o(2−Nβ∗ ),
(30)
where (a) is because E ⊂ I ∪ R ⊆ Lρw that the corresponding Z(W (i)wN) = 0; (b) is due to
Theo. 3.
Therefore, when N is infinite, have limN→∞ Pe(T ) = 0, which indicates that reliability can
be achieved. When N is finite, it can be observed that if β∗ increases, the decoding error rate
will decrease and a better reliability performance can be achieved.
Proposition 3 (Security) By choosing a proper β∗, strong security can be achieved by the
proposed secure polar coding scheme over AWTC model.
Proof: For block t, let Mt = UI\E , Zt = ZN , Et = UE and Ft = UF . Then the information
leakage for entire T blocks is L(T ) = I(M1:T ; Z1:T ).
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For multi-block chaining structure, as deduced in [6, Section IV-B], with publicly known frozen
bits, have
L(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
I(Mt,Et,Ft; Zt) + I(E0; Z0), (31)
where I(E0; Z0) refers to the information leakage of the pre-shared bits before transmission
which should be 0.
Let a1 < a2 < ... < a|A| be the correspondent indices of the elements UA for any subset A,
such that UA , Ua1:a|A| = Ua1 , ..., Ua|A| . Since subsets I ∪ F and R match the construction
of induced channel [5, Lem. 15], we have
I(Mt,Et,Ft; Zt) =I(UI∪F ;ZN)
=
|I∪F|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;ZN |Ua1:ai−1)
(a)
=
|I∪F|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;Ua
1:ai−1 , ZN)
≤
|I∪F|∑
i=1
I(Ua
i
;U1:a
i−1, ZN)
(b)
=
∑
j∈I∪F
max
[
I(W
(j)
rN ), I(W
(j)
1−ρrN
)
]
(c)
≤o(N2−Nβ∗ ),
(33)
where (a) is because Ua
i
are independent from each other; (b) is because Eve can use either WNr
or WN1−ρr for SC decoding and her best strategy is to choose the one with higher capacity from
W
(j)
rN and W
(j)
1−ρrN
; (c) is because that, by choosing a proper β∗, have (I∪F) ⊆ Hr and from
(20) have Z(W (j)rN ) = 1 for all j ∈ Hr, thus form (22), have I(W (j)rN ) = 0 for j ∈ I ∪F; (c) is
also because (24) and (26)that for j ∈ I ∪ F, have I(W (j)1−ρrN) = 1− Z(W
(j)
1−ρrN
) ≤ 2−Nβ∗ .
Thus we have L(T ) ≤ o(TN2−Nβ∗ ). When N is infinite, have limN→∞ L(T ) = 0, which
indicates that strong security can be achieved. When N is finite, it can be observed that if
β∗ increases, the information leakage will decrease and a better security performance can be
achieved.
Proposition 4 (Secrecy rate) When N is infinite, by choosing a proper β∗, the proposed secure
polar coding scheme cam achieve the secrecy capacity of AWTC model.
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Proof: Since for entire T blocks, message bits M1:T are transmitted over subset I \ E
which is proven secure and reliable with proper β∗, we have the secrecy rate as
Rs(T ) =
∑T
t=1 |I \ E|
TN
=
|I \ E|
N
. (34)
Then when N is infinite, have
lim
N→∞
Rs(T ) = lim
N→∞
|I \ E|
N
= lim
N→∞
|I ∪R| − |E ∪R|
N
= lim
N→∞
|I ∪R| − |B ∪R|
N
= lim
N→∞
|Lρw | − |Hc1−ρr |
N
= 1− ρw − ρr,
(36)
where (a) is due to [5, Theo. 1] that
lim
N→∞
|Lρw |
N
= I(Wρw ) = 1− ρw,
lim
N→∞
|Hc1−ρr |
N
= I(W1−ρr ) = ρr,
(38)
Thus the secrecy capacity of AWTC model can be achieved with a proper β∗ and infinite N .
B. Simulations
Next, we test the performance of proposed secure polar coding scheme with finite block length
N .
First, we test the upper bound of information leakage in (33), upper bound of legitimate BER
in (30) and the secrecy rate in (34). Particularly, we let ρw = 0.2, ρr = 0.4, block length N = 28
to 218, parameter β = 0.20 to 0.32 and block number T = 300.
The simulation results are illustrated in Fig. 5. Fig. 5a shows the decrease of upper bound of
legitimate BER with the growing of block length N for all β, which matches our analysis of
reliability in Prop. 2. There are some unstable point in Fig. 5a which is because the corresponding
value of β is not in the range of proper β∗ for that block length N . Then with the increasing of
block length N , this unstable phenomenon is disappear, which matches Prop. 1. Fig. 5b shows
the decrease of upper bound of information leakage with the growing of block length N for all
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Fig. 5. Simulation results of performance with finite block length N .
β, which matches our analysis of security in Prop. 3. Fig. 5c shows the increase of secrecy rate
with the growing of block length N for all β, which matches our analysis of secrecy rate in
Prop. 4.
Next, we test the actual BERs for both Bob and Eve by implementing the entire secure
communication process over AWTC model. Particularly, we let ρw = 0.2, ρr = 0.4, block length
N = 28 to 212, parameter β = 0.22 to 0.30 and block number T = 1000. For the transmitted
message, we use uniformly distributed binary random bits.
The simulation results are illustrated in Fig. 6. Fig. 6a is the BER of entire 1000 blocks for
legitimate user Bob decoding the message bits, which shows that the legitimate BER decreases
significantly with the increasing of block length N for all the β. Fig. 6b is the BER of entire 1000
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Fig. 6. Simulation results of actual BERs.
blocks for eavesdropper Eve decoding the message bits, which shows that the eavesdropper BER
remains closely to 0.5 with the increasing of block length N for all the β. Therefore, Fig. 6 proves
that the proposed securer polar coding scheme can provide secure and reliable communication
over the AWTC model with finite block length N .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the secure coding problem of AWTC model. We have
presented an channel based equivalent model of AWTC model by using the ρ equivalent channel
block. Then we have studied the polarization relationship of the ρ equivalent channel block and
the ρ BEC block and found out that by choosing a proper polarization parameter β = β∗, the
polarized subsets of ρ BEC block is fully contained by the polarized subsets of ρ equivalent
channel block (Prop. 1). Based on this results, we have constructed a sucre polar coding scheme
for the AWTC model and analyzed its performance. Theoretically, we have proven that the
proposed scheme achieves the secrecy capacity of AWTC model under both reliability and
strong security criterions with an infinite block length N . Further, for the case of finite block
length N , we have carried out simulations which proves that the proposed secure polar coding
scheme can provide secure and reliable communication over AWTC model.
The containment relationship of polarized subsets for ρ equivalent channel block and ρ BEC
block in Prop. 1 is the key element of our secure polar coding construction. In this work, we
obtained this key result by observing from the simulation test, which is however not rigourous
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enough, although its correctness has been proven by the communication experiments of the
proposed secure polar coding scheme. Thus the theoretical proof of Prop. 1 will be our future
work.
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